Category: Misinformation and Disinfomation

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Election 2020 in Review: Ballot Duplication in the News

Definition of ballot duplication

With the November 3, 2020 election in the nation’s rearview mirror, it is time to examine some of the challenges that affected military and overseas ballots the Overseas Voting Initiative (OVI) discussed in the lead up to the presidential election.

One such topic is ballot duplication. In the coming weeks, the OVI will examine:

  • noteworthy instances of ballot duplication that occurred last fall;
  • implementation of new automated ballot duplication systems and how they fared;
  • in-person and remote observation of ballot duplication and post-election processes during the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions; and
  • ideas for improvement to the ballot duplication process going forward.

Last summer, the OVI issued a series of articles regarding ballot duplication and providing timely recommendations for election officials to consider in 2020. It was anticipated that the pandemic would result in an increase in the use of absentee, by mail and other ballots cast outside of polling places. This, in turn, would necessitate an increase in duplication.

In fact, the topic of ballot duplication was discussed frequently by election officials and in the media as voting procedures were a focus of post-election analysis.

Election officials across the country, including those in Montgomery County, Maryland, Marin County, California, and San Joaquin County, California, proactively shared information  with their communities and the media on their processes for duplicating damaged or otherwise machine-unreadable ballots prior to November 3, 2020. The Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) even highlighted the ballot duplication process preemptively – and cited the OVI’s article series – in its highly-referenced “Rumor Control” website explaining that, “In some circumstances, elections officials are permitted to “duplicate” or otherwise further mark cast ballots to ensure they can be properly counted.”

Despite the diligent work by election officials and others to explain the nature and purpose of ballot duplication, the topic was still a subject of considerable misinformation and disinformation [1] post-election. For example, officials in Delaware County, Pennsylvania were forced to debunk manipulated video of their ballot duplication process and City of Detroit election officials testified about the process to their state senate.

Perhaps most notably, Maricopa County, Arizona authorities worked to explain and combat ballot duplication misinformation and disinformation that quickly spread on social media. This was focused on proper vs. improper methods for marking paper ballots and concerns about whether these ballots would be counted. This became known as “Sharpiegate.” It was featured in CISA’s Rumor Control site, again referencing the OVI series on ballot duplication.

Additionally, there were stories about jurisdictions utilizing the ballot duplication process for ballots affected by the following notable circumstances:

  • Ballots with Printing Errors – In Tarrant County, Texas, election workers had to duplicate one-third of the jurisdiction’s absentee ballots due to a printing error that rendered bar codes illegible on approximately 20,000 ballots. Ballots in Outagamie County, Wisconsin contained a misprint visible in a black square — known as a timing mark — near the edge of the ballots. The misprint necessitated the duplication of 13,500 ballots so ballot machines could read them accurately.
  • Burned and Water Damaged Ballots – 2020 saw ballot drop boxes set on fire in Boston and Los Angeles. In Boston, there were 122 ballots inside the drop box when it was set on fire, only 87 of which were legible and able to be counted, though it is likely some fire-damaged ballots required duplication to go through ballot scanners. In Los Angeles, another ballot drop box fire resulted in over 200 damaged ballots left in a seared, soggy pile. Election officials had to sift through these to see what could be saved, again, likely using ballot duplication procedures. In both instances, voters whose ballots were not able to be saved received replacement ballots.
  • Braille and Large Print Ballots – Election jurisdictions offer a variety of assistance and services to aid voters with accessibility challenges. In some jurisdictions, like counties throughout Arizona, Braille and large print ballots are offered to voters. Prior to the November 3 election, Maricopa County election officials received requests for 26 Braille ballots and 555 large print ballots, all of which needed to be duplicated upon return before they could be counted. While duplication of Braille and large print ballots was not new in 2020, extensive discussion of it was.

The next article in this series will cover how ballot duplication and other post-election processes were viewed by both in-person and remote election observers while dealing with physical distancing, building capacity restrictions, and other COVID-19 restrictions.

[1] Misinformation is false information that one spreads because they believe it to be true. Disinformation is false information that one spreads even though they know it to be false. The difference between the two is intent.

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Every Vote Counts: Military and Overseas Voting Ballots

Breakdown of UOCAVA numbers

In the lead up to the Nov. 3, there have been countless articles about military and overseas voters. Some encouraging the voters to return their ballots as soon as possible. Others are speculating about how important these voters may be to the election. It has brought to the forefront of our minds the age-old myth that military and overseas ballots are only counted if it is a close race.

Traditionally, the majority of Americans head to their local polling place on election day and cast their vote in person with not much thought given to absentee ballots. Polls are often congested places on Election Day. In light of Covid-19 health risks, many states have turned to absentee voting as a method of cutting down on the number of people crowded into gymnasiums, churches, and other polling locations. However, military voters have voted via absentee ballot since the U.S. Civil War, and those protections were codified in 1986 with the Uniform and Absentee Citizen Voting Act (UOCAVA).

Election officials are required count every valid ballot that comes into their possession prior to their state’s relevant deadlines. For a ballot to be valid, a voter must have completed the ballot and relevant identification processes according to state law. This can include signatures on envelopes, proof of identification, witness certification, etc.

Deadlines for ballots to be received by election officials are different for each state and there are special considerations for military and overseas citizens- find yours here. For example:

  • In Florida, if you are living outside of the U.S. your ballot must be postmarked by Nov. 3 and will be counted as long as it is received by the 10th day AFTER the election.
  • In New York, your ballot must be postmarked by Nov. 3, and the received by the local election office by the 13th day AFTER the election.
  • In California, your ballot must be postmarked by Nov. 3 and, for the November General election only, must be received no later than 17 days AFTER the election.
  • In Arizona, your ballot must be received by your election office by 7:00p.m. Nov. 3.

If you have concerns about the status of your ballot, contact your local election official, or check their website. States are required by the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act to have some method by which UOCAVA voters can track their ballot. In some states there is a phone number to call, but many states have websites dedicated to tracking the status of your absentee ballot.

Election officials do not “call” elections. That is something done by the media . Instead election officials are responsible for counting each and every valid ballot that receive before deadlines. The media have methodology they employee in order to “call” an election. Even after the media has “called” an election, election officials continue their official counting process, which can include recounts. Local election officials provide their official count to a state’s chief election officer (oftentimes the Secretary of State), who will certify the official count. See more on that here. Record numbers of absentee ballots are expected this year which could cause some delay to election results, but rest assured that election officials will be working hard to get every validly submitted timely ballot counted

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Election Safeguards – Combating Election Disinformation

In recent years, the prevalence of disinformation (i.e. information intended to deceive) online has flourished. Disinformation pertaining to the integrity and security of elections has proven no exception. Results from a recent study have shown that, during the 2016 election alone, 25% of the 30 million tweets preceding election day were found to spread either purposefully inaccurate or extremely biased information.

As the November 3rd election approaches, the focus of efforts at disinformation has increasingly centered around the mail-in voting process and the consequent ability of state and local election officials to accurately record election results. Combating disinformation may appear a herculean task; however, communicating the election safeguards in place is a practical and effective means through which election officials can do so.

Election Safeguards in the States

Election Official Training

In the United States, the administration of elections is handled at the state and local level. Although this leads to varying administrative and voting procedures across jurisdictions, every election official undergoes frequent and rigorous training to understand how to best conduct elections and ensure their integrity. Topics covered in these trainings range from polling place and vote center management to building ballots, developing audit trails, processing absentee ballots and ensuring systems security, among others. Each state possesses its own election manuals on similar topics that are reviewed and updated annually.

Central to election officials’ training is how to strengthen and employ election safeguards to prevent voter fraud via mail-in ballot. This has become particularly salient in light of the coronavirus pandemic and the resultant expansion of mail-in options for voters in most states. These safeguards include, but are not limited to, processes for determining voter identification and eligibility (e.g. required presence of public notary or witnesses, signed voter affidavit and signature matching); checks for ballot tampering; and the ballot curing process. For a state breakdown on these processes, please refer to the National Conference of State Legislators’ resources on state verification of absentee ballot applications and state verification of voted absentee ballots

Each of these trainings work in tandem with one another to keep voter fraud via mail ballots to nominal levels. For example, a recent study conducted by the Brookings Institution revealed that from 2005 to 2018, there were 30 cases of alleged voter fraud (including in-person voting) in Colorado, one of the nation’s few entirely vote-by-mail states. With a total of 15,855,704 votes cast in this time frame, these instances of fraud constituted 0.00019% of total votes.

Election Infrastructure Security

Election safeguards, however, are not confined to minimizing the potential for human error among election officials. Election infrastructure safeguards also are in place to prevent – or at least mitigate – direct attempts to compromise the integrity of elections. According to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), “every state’s election infrastructure is protected by an intrusion detection system…and all 50 states and more than 2,500 local jurisdictions receive real-time threat information.” CISA also is available to election officials to provide cybersecurity assessments and detection and prevention of threats, as well as share factual, reliable election security information to further public education and awareness.

To augment these infrastructure safeguards, state and local election officials often undergo additional training explicitly focused on cybersecurity. For example, in recent years CISA developed the Elections Cyber Tabletop Exercise Package, which includes template exercise objectives, scenarios and discussion questions as well as a collection of cybersecurity references and resources. Example scenarios include the disruption of registration information systems, attacks on state board of election websites and ransomware infection of county computer systems Since 2017, CISA has conducted 55 elections-focused exercises. This includes four national exercises (three iterations of Tabletop the Vote and one Executive Elections Tabletop Exercise) and conducted dozens of tailored exercises for individual states and critical infrastructure partners. They have had exercise engagements with all 50 states and the District of Columbia. 

This election year, numerous attempts have been made to undermine public confidence in the integrity of our electoral system. The prevalence of voter fraud has been drastically overstated, and the security of our election infrastructure called into question. Combating this disinformation will require concerted efforts extending far beyond this election cycle; however, election officials are already equipped with the necessary information to do so – the comprehensive nature of our election safeguards.

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How did they get my voter information!?: Access and Use of Voter Registration Lists

Breakdown of UOCAVA numbers

There is a difference between general voter information that is readily available to the public in voter registration lists; and sensitive personal information that is protected by numerous safeguards.

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 requires the chief election official of each state to implement a “single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list.” This list is to be “defined, maintained, and administered at the State level.”[1] The goal is to allow states to have a computerized list of voters. This allows state and local election officials immediate electronic access to  check the registration status of a voter. It also allows verification of voter information with other state, local and federal agencies; provides a means for list maintenance; and tracks certain appropriate voting histories.

Historically, these lists have been available for campaign purposes. But different states have different requirements for who can request a list of voters and what information that list includes.[2] Additionally, many states have specific Address Confidentiality Programs (ACP) to keep voter information confidential for certain classes of voters, such as victims of domestic violence, sexual assault or stalking. Some examples of state requirements for requesting a voter registration list include:

  • Alaska: Anyone can request a copy of the state voter registration list, which contains the names, addresses and party affiliations of all registered voters in the state. Voters may request in writing to keep their residential address confidential, if they provide a separate mailing address.[3]
  • Colorado: Voter registration lists are available to the public upon request and contain a voter’s full name, address, year of birth, political party and vote history. Information remains private for ACP participants and pre-registrants[4] (a procedure that allows individuals under 18 to register to vote so they are eligible to cast a ballot when they reach 18).
  • Massachusetts: State party committees, statewide candidate committees, state ballot question committees, the jury commissioner, adjutant general and any other individual, agency, or entity that the Secretary of State designates may request the list, which includes names and addresses. Information on ACP participants remains private.[5]
  • Idaho: Any person may request a voter registration list, which include voter name, address and precinct – excluding ACP participants.[6]

Thus far in 2020, there is no evidence that voter registration systems have been penetrated by foreign or domestic actors. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), in conjunction with the FBI, has released a public alert about false claims of hacked voter information. The agencies believe the intention of these claims is to cast doubt of the legitimacy of U.S. elections.[7]

Importantly, that a voter registration system is experiencing an outage does not necessarily mean a voter registration information or other election system has been compromised.[8] In fact, there are many innocuous reasons such errors occur, including configuration errors and natural disasters. [9] Additionally, foreign and domestic cyber actors may make claims they have “hacked” these databases in order to undermine confidence in the November 3 election and U.S. election institutions. In reality, these actors merely have information that is publicly available.

Voter misinformation (false information) and disinformation (false information designed to mislead) campaigns by foreign and domestic actors have been and will continue to be an issue for U.S. election institutions. It is important that federal, state, and local election officials and voters continue to question the veracity of these campaigns and claims. State and local election officials in collaboration with federal agencies, such as CISA, work and train to conduct elections as safely, fairly and securely as possible.

[1] Help Americans Vote Act §303(a)(1)(A0(i)-§303(a)(1)(A)(viii)

[2] Access To and Use of Voter Registration Lists, National Conference of State Legislatures https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/access-to-and-use-of-voter-registration-lists.aspx

[3] AS §15.07.127 and §15.07.195

[4] Colo. Rev. Stat. §1-2-302, §24-30-2108, §1-2-227

[5] Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 51 §47C, §37, §44

[6] Idaho Code §34-437, §34-437A, §19-5706

[7] False Claims of Hacked Voter Information Likely Intended to Cast Doubt on Legitimacy of U.S. Elections https://www.cisa.gov/publication/false-claims-hacked-voter-information-likely-intended-cast-doubt-legitimacy-us

[8] See CISA Cyber Threats to Voting Processes Could Slow but Not Prevent Voting, https://www.cisa.gov/publication/cyber-threats-voting-processes-could-slow-not-prevent-voting

[9] CISA #Protect2020 Rumor vs. Reality https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol