Voting in Presidential Primaries and the General Election Differ for UOCAVA Voters

By Grace Gordon, Research Lead and Project Manager

Introduction

Presidential primaries work in unique and complex ways for overseas voters. Overseas citizens can vote in either their state-specific primary or, in some cases, a primary explicitly for overseas citizens. However, registering to vote in a presidential primary specifically for overseas citizens does not constitute registration for your state’s upcoming elections.

Before the 2024 presidential election, all overseas voters should ensure their state voter registration is up to date. To do this, overseas voters must double-check with their state or local election office ahead of the UOCAVA registration deadline for November’s presidential election. To ensure they receive their ballot in time, these voters should register using the Federal Post Card Application (FPCA) or through the voters’ home state formal process.

Background

In 1986, Congress passed the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA). This act permitted “absent uniformed services voters and overseas voters to use absentee registration procedures and to vote by absentee ballot in general, special, primary, and runoff elections for Federal office.” All states have designated processes for overseas voters to register to vote and cast a ballot. While the methods differ from state to state, all states accept the Federal Post Card Application as a form of registration for federal elections. For presidential party primaries, there are different methods for overseas voters to register to vote and cast a ballot.

In general elections, known as presidential elections, voters vote in their home state and electors in that state cast their vote for president based on the popular vote. Party primaries differ from the general election in several ways. Instead of electors casting votes based on the election results in each state or territory, delegates cast votes at the party convention. Each party has a different process for selecting delegates. Most delegates for the Democratic convention are chosen based on proportional representation. Whereas the Republican party primary uses a combination of proportional and winner-take-all representation decided by the states. Democrats Abroad is an organization that conducts a Global Presidential Primary for all overseas voters registered with the organization. Democrats Abroad receives several votes at the Democratic National Convention, which are allocated to delegates based on the results of the Global Presidential Primary.

Overseas voters who want to register to vote in the Democratic primary have two paths. They can register directly with Democrats Abroad and have their vote count towards the Democrats Abroad delegate allocation, or they can register directly with their state and put their vote towards their states’ delegates. There is no organization equivalent for registered Republicans, and Republicans living overseas must register with their state to vote in the Republican Party Primary.

All voters must register to vote for the general election in their state regardless of their political party affiliation. Voters registered with Democrats Abroad in the primary must ensure that their state registration is active through the state absentee registration process or use the FPCA to register and cast a ballot.

FPCA and Voter Registration Processes

The FPCA offers a streamlined, easy-to-use voter registration and absentee ballot request form for overseas voters. In some states, the FPCA is accepted as an application to vote for all state and federal contests; in others, it is just a request for federal contests. To access the form, qualified voters can go to https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/Forms/fpca.pdf.

Most state election websites offer detailed instructions on registering as a UOCAVA voter. The state or municipal voter registration process may offer another option for voters who prefer to register directly with their state rather than using the FPCA.

The Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) has numerous resources for military and overseas voters seeking to register to vote in either the primaries or the general election. The following resources directly apply to this topic:

How to check your voter registration as an overseas voter

For overseas voters who cast a ballot in the primaries and are unsure if they are registered for the general election, the following steps can be used to check their voter registration in their home state:

  1. Do not rely on third-party groups to confirm voter registration status.
  2. Identify the state or local election office website, phone number or email.
  3. Contact an election official, ideally in the municipality where they are registered to vote. Some states offer a state voter registration lookup tool. In others, the overseas citizen will need to call or send an email to confirm their registration.
  4. Any overseas citizens who are not registered can register to vote in the primary using the FPCA or state/municipal voter registration process. The deadline to register for UOCAVA voters is 30 days before the general election for federal offices but varies for state and municipal elections.

Conclusion

UOCAVA voters face extra hurdles when voting abroad. These include delays in international mail, difficulty accessing printers to print ballots or other election materials and challenges delivering their ballots back to their election office. Many states allow voters to fax their ballots back to the US, though access to fax machines continues to dwindle worldwide.

Election officials do everything they can to ensure UOCAVA voters have equal access to the ballot. Still, if a voter does not register to vote and indicate their international address, election officials cannot send them a ballot. To complicate matters, some overseas voters may vote in primary elections explicitly for overseas voters. Overseas voters who voted in the Democrats Abroad Global Presidential Primary must register to vote for the general election in their state. Registration with Democrats Abroad does not imply registration with a state for the general election. To ensure overseas voters who want to vote in the general election can do so, all overseas voters should double-check their voter registration as soon as possible.

Voter Registration for Americans Abroad: Strategies to Address Common Challenges

By Rachel Wright, Policy Analyst

In 2022, nearly 4.4 million American citizens lived overseas. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) guarantees their right to vote absentee in federal elections, and like voters living stateside, many overseas citizens want to exercise this right. However, whether they are expatriates, students or peace corps volunteers, their path to the ballot box is often fraught with challenges.

For many voters, this path begins with the voter registration process. UOCAVA sets out to provide overseas citizens with a uniform and accessible means of registration by allowing them to use the Federal Postcard Application (FPCA) and the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB). The conditions surrounding registration deadlines, allowed return methods and validity periods, among other things, vary significantly among states.

Election officials often help overseas voters by reducing the challenges they face. The Overseas Voting Initiative (OVI) works closely with state and local election officials to better understand these challenges and share best practices related to overseas voting. Provided below are several common voter registration challenges faced by overseas citizens, along with strategies that working group members have developed to mitigate them.

International Mail System Reliability

Mail system reliability varies across countries and can pose a significant challenge for voters who return their FPCA via mail. The FPCA is a standard form developed by the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) that allows a UOCAVA voter to simultaneously register to vote and request an absentee ballot. It can be easily downloaded from FVAP’s website or accessed via your state or local election official’s website.

As of August 2024, three states — Alabama, Arkansas and Connecticut — only allow for an FPCA to be returned via mail. Voters in states that allow for electronic return may also default to mailing their FPCA if they are not sure of their state’s requirements. For these voters, utilizing an unreliable mail system may negatively impact the likelihood that their registration materials and ballot request will be received on time and by the proper election authority.

The impact of mail system reliability on the return of voter registration materials such as the FPCA is yet to be quantified. We do, however, know the impact it has on ballot success. A 2016 FVAP study found that overseas citizens in countries with the most reliable postal systems were 65% more likely to have a vote recorded compared to those in countries with the lowest observed levels of postal reliability. This figure, although stark, does not account for the number of voters who may not have received a ballot due to unsuccessful attempts to return their FPCA via mail.

Strategy 1: In states that allow for electronic return, election officials can encourage overseas citizens to return their FPCA electronically and communicate this information to voters via dedicated UOCAVA webpages and social media. Should a voter return their FPCA via email, election officials can use this touchpoint to establish open and consistent lines of communication to update voters on the status of their FPCA, upcoming deadlines and allowed return ballot methods. FVAP has developed an outreach toolkit for the 2024 election that contains email templates for these touchpoints. This toolkit can be accessed here.  

Strategy 2: In states that do not allow FPCAs to be returned electronically, election officials can clearly communicate voter registration deadlines (including postmark deadlines, if applicable) via UOCAVA webpages and social media. They can also encourage voters to return their FPCA as soon as they leave the U.S., regardless of where they are residing overseas. Many overseas citizens live in countries with high postal system reliability; however, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that mail disruptions can occur anywhere and at any point in time. Returning an FPCA as soon as possible can help mitigate potential negative impacts caused by unforeseen international mail delays.

The FWAB as an Alternative Means of Voter Registration

The FWAB is intended to serve as a backup ballot and alternative means to register to vote if a military or overseas citizen does not receive their absentee ballot in time to meet their state’s deadlines. In select states, overseas citizens are not allowed to use the FWAB if they haven’t already registered to vote. This variation can lead to confusion, especially if these requirements change from year to year.

For example, as of August 2024, 33 states allow UOCAVA voters to use the FWAB to register to vote. Those in the remaining 17 states must be registered to vote and have already requested a state absentee ballot to use the FWAB. This includes overseas citizens from Hawaii and New York who were not subject to this requirement prior to 2024.

Moreover, confusion grows when states have differing requirements based on the type of UOCAVA voter. For example, Wisconsin only allows uniformed service members and their family to use the FWAB to register to vote. Overseas citizens must already be registered to vote to use the FWAB and can only use the FWAB to vote in elections for federal offices. More information about these rules is available in the “2024-25 Voting Assistance Guide.”

Map of U.S. states that allow UOCAVA voters to use the FWAB to register to vote.

Strategy 1: States can prevent confusion among overseas citizens surrounding whether they can use the FWAB to register to vote by instituting uniform requirements for all UOCAVA voters. This would entail allowing military service members, their family and overseas citizens to use the FWAB to vote in all elections for federal state and local offices, including ballot measures, regardless of whether the voter has registered to vote and requested a state ballot prior to using the FWAB. In doing so, states would simplify the voting process for overseas citizens and ensure all UOCAVA voters can utilize the same backup options.

Unintended Impacts of Automatic Voter Registration Systems

In states that utilize an automatic voter registration (AVR) system, UOCAVA voters may knowingly or unknowingly update their voter registration without realizing the unintended impacts it might have on their UOCAVA status. Although many systems allow voters to “opt-out” of automatic registration, many overseas citizens may not understand how automatic registration could impact their UOCAVA status and refrain from opting out.

For example, an overseas citizen may access a government service that uses the information gained throughout this transaction to update their voter registration. If the government agency does not collect information related to the voter’s UOCAVA status, their registration may be updated to indicate that they are a regular absentee voter. As a result, the overseas citizen may unknowingly be stripped of their UOCAVA status.

States and local jurisdictions have encountered similar issues with overseas citizens who renew their driver’s license or state ID online. In these instances, a voter has their new driver’s license or ID mailed to the address of a family member living stateside who then mails the ID to the UOCAVA voter. The DMV then uses the original mailing address provided to update the voter’s registration. In doing so, the voter may be stripped of their UOCAVA status, or, in some cases, registered as a voter in an entirely different jurisdiction.  


Third-Party Organization Involvement in the Voter Registration Process


Third-party organizations may communicate with overseas citizens regarding voter registration, upcoming elections and approaching deadlines. These efforts are made in good faith, but may result in overseas citizens receiving confusing, conflicting or incorrect information.

For example, state and local election officials have seen an increasing number of overseas citizens who have registered to vote in presidential primaries explicitly for overseas citizens through third-party organizations (e.g., the Democrats Abroad presidential primary). Voters believe that voting in this primary constitutes registration for an upcoming presidential election. This, however, is not true.

This trend underscores the need for election officials to conduct effective outreach to overseas citizens and establish open lines of communication so that they receive the most up to date and accurate election information.


Strategy 1: To prevent these scenarios, state election officials can build check points into their AVR system that notifies a UOCAVA voter’s local election official if the system is attempting to update their registration. The voter’s local election official will then investigate (i.e., communicate with the voter) to ensure their registration is updated with the correct information. States such as Oregon have already implemented these control procedures into their AVR system.

Strategy 2: States can also prevent overseas citizens from being unintentionally stripped of their UOCAVA status by allowing an FPCA to remain valid and in effect through the end of the election year regardless of whether the voter is registered via their state’s AVR system in the interim. UOCAVA requires all states to abide by certain provisions related to the FPCA. However, states do have the authority to determine its period of validity. States such as West Virginia have already implemented this measure.

U.S. citizens living abroad face significant barriers when attempting to vote that may prevent them from participating in U.S. elections. For many voters, these barriers arise as early as the voter registration process and persist even after they have returned their ballot. Proactive engagement by election officials, clear and consistent communication with overseas voters, and simplifying the voting process are key to helping every voter exercise their right to vote.

Remote Observation and Ballot Duplication in Florida’s Brevard County 

Florida’s Brevard County Supervisor of Elections Highlights Remote Observation Procedures and an Improved Ballot Duplication Process During Overseas Voting Initiative Visit  

Last year, members of the Overseas Voting Initiative (OVI) Working Group met in Central Florida to discuss the ongoing and emerging issues faced by Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) voters when attempting to cast their ballot. As part of this convening, Brevard County Supervisor of Elections Tim Bobanic provided working group members with a tour of his county’s warehouse in Melbourne, where his office conducts various administrative procedures, such as ballot duplication. In addition to his role with Brevard County, Bobanic is a member of the OVI working group.  

OVI provides extensive programming to working group members focused on understanding and improving the voting process for military and overseas citizens. Touring election offices such as the Melbourne warehouse provides members with a behind the scenes look into how jurisdictions with large UOCAVA populations help these individuals overcome voting barriers and successfully cast their ballot.  

While touring the Brevard County election facility, working group members witnessed several administrative best practices in action, including the use of live streams that allow the public to remotely observe various election processes. Members also learned about Brevard County’s use of technology solutions to streamline ballot duplication procedures and facilitate the processing of absentee and UOCAVA ballots. 

On March 8, 2023, Brevard County Supervisor of Elections Tim Bobanic (second from right) guided OVI Working Group members, CSG team members and Federal Voting Assistance Program staff around the Brevard County Supervisor of Elections Melbourne warehouse. Working group members Anthony Albence of Delaware (left), Natalie Adona of Nevada County, California (second from left), and Aaron Nevarez of Los Angeles County, California (right), looked on and listened. This photo was taken by Katy Owens Hubler. 

Bobanic’s role as supervisor of elections serves the voters of Titusville, Melbourne, Palm Bay and Viera, which boast a total population of just over 600,000 residents, including approximately 430,000 who are registered to vote. The Melbourne facility is one of several satellite offices throughout the county that work in tandem to ensure Brevard County elections run smoothly. 

OVI working group members were joined at the modern Melbourne facility by representatives with the Federal Voting Assistance Program, including Director Scott Wiedmann. It’s there Bobanic led the group around, highlighting the location’s large warehouse and numerous office areas. As Florida’s 10th largest jurisdiction, much space is needed to conduct the county’s manual and electronically-aided election processes. 

The first area shown to working group members was the public viewing area, which sits just inside the facility’s entryway. This location was chosen to provide the public, media, candidates and other interested stakeholders with easy access to the viewing area. Once inside, working group members observed two dozen monitors which broadcast various election processes in real-time for members of the public to view.  

The public viewing area of the Melbourne warehouse in Brevard County, Florida, allows individuals to view the ballot duplication process and other post-election procedures on large screens. The number on each screen corresponds to a ballot duplication workstation in the facility that is equipped with a live stream camera. This photo was taken by Katy Owens Hubler on March 8, 2023. 

According to Brevard County officials, the public viewing area serves to educate voters on local election processes and increase the transparency of elections, all while minimizing disruptions to the processes being viewed. While in the viewing area, spectators can ask questions and flag any concerns, but they are not physically among election workers as they move about the facility.   

At the time of the OVI’s visit, ballot duplication processes throughout Brevard County were being broadcast for the public to view. Ballot duplication is the process by which a damaged or improperly marked ballot is replaced with a new, machine-readable ballot that preserves the voter’s intent. Monitors in the viewing area allowed members to observe live camera feeds of each ballot duplication work area in the county. In doing so, working group members and the public can see every ballot duplication process taking place throughout the county simultaneously. 

While in the viewing area, Bobanic shared that a few months earlier, his office purchased Enhanced Remake, a ballot duplication solution offered by Enhanced Voting. Enhanced Remake is a technology solution that “easily remakes any unreadable ballots with less effort and less mistakes …” It is available as an online service or an offline software.  

Brevard County purchased both the Enhanced Remake hardware and software, which functions as a self-contained, offline station. Bobanic hoped to have the software up and running for the 2022 election cycle — a goal which he and his staff accomplished. Members of the OVI working group were able to view a demonstration of Brevard County’s Enhanced Remake station while touring the Melbourne facility. A similar demonstration, offered by Enhanced Voting, can be accessed here.  

Brevard County Supervisor of Elections Tim Bobanic (centered, wearing a blue shirt) stood in the ballot duplication room at his Melbourne office on March 8, 2023 explaining the county’s new ballot duplication process using new equipment from Florida-based Enhanced Voting and public display monitors. This photo was taken by Katy Owens Hubler.

Enhanced Remake is one of many technology solutions on the market that automate aspects of the ballot duplication process using a combination of software and hardware (i.e., ballot duplication devices). Regardless of the technology solution, any jurisdiction can live stream the ballot duplication process by equipping duplication workstations with cameras that broadcast a live feed to a public viewing area. Election officials can then narrate the processes being broadcast and answer questions from the public, media or other interested stakeholders. 

For more information on ballot duplication, please read the OVI article series on this topic. OVI has also published an article on the remote observation of ballot duplication and other post-election processes, which is accessible here

We thank Brevard County Supervisor of Elections Tim Bobanic and his staff for welcoming OVI to the Melbourne facility and we look forward to visiting more election offices in the coming years.  

Assigning an Address for Voting Purposes: How Election Officials Help Military and Overseas Citizens Vote

By Rachel Wright, Policy Analyst

Voters covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) face many challenges when attempting to cast their ballot. Both members of the military and overseas citizens often have limited access to technologies, such as printers and fax machines, that help them vote. Moreover, these voters often work or are stationed in remote areas where mail operations are intermittent or, in some cases, non-existent. 

Voter Registration and Determining Voting Residency 

For military and overseas citizens, voting barriers can often arise prior to ballot marking and return. Some UOCAVA voters may struggle to successfully complete their voter registration due to issues and uncertainties surrounding their residential address. Regardless of the state, voter registration laws require all voters to provide a residential address on registration materials. This address is considered the individual’s voting residence and determines which offices and candidates they are eligible to vote for. As a result, a voter’s residential address is often required to be located within the state where they are becoming a registered voter.  

Unlike traditional absentee voters, it can be difficult for military and overseas citizens to determine their voting residence. For example, many overseas citizens living abroad no longer occupy a residence in the United States. In these instances, overseas voters may still consider their last residential address in the U.S. as their voting residence even if they no longer have property or other ties to that state or if their intent to return to that state is uncertain. However, these voters may not remember the details of this address, or they may be unaware of their state’s laws on this issue. 

Similarly, military voters frequently change duty assignments which can result in their relocation to a new installation. In these instances, a voter may wish to establish residency or a domicile in their new duty location or remain a registered voter of their last residential address. As with overseas citizens, frequent reassignments can cause confusion regarding what is considered their residential address for voting purposes. They also may not remember the details of this address. 

The Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) has issued guidance on how UOCAVA voters should determine their voting residence. This guidance differs based on the type of UOCAVA voter. Guidance for military service members and their family members can be accessed at https://www.fvap.gov/info/laws/voting-residence. Guidance for overseas citizens can be accessed at https://www.fvap.gov/citizen-voter/voting-residence.  

Assigning an Address for Voting Purposes 

A small subset of UOCAVA voters may be able to identify and provide the details of their residential address but discover that this address is no longer considered valid for voter registration purposes. This can occur if a voter’s address is no longer considered a residence. For example, single-family homes or apartment buildings may be demolished for commercial development or following a natural disaster. Once the home or apartment building is torn down, the associated address is no longer considered a recognized residential address. This may occur more frequently among UOCAVA voters who have not lived at their voting residence for a significant period. 

If this situation arises, states do not prohibit military and overseas citizens from becoming a registered voter in the precinct of their address. Many states do not explicitly address these situations in statute and likely handle them on a case-by-case basis. However, 10 states — Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Utah and Virginia — specify that the appropriate authority, often a local election official, can assign the voter an address solely for voting purposes as long as the voter meets the state’s residency requirements. This address must be within the same precinct as the voter’s residential address. 

For example, South Carolina S.C. Code Ann. §  7-15-660 states “an overseas voter who is registering to vote, and who is eligible to vote in this State shall use, and must be assigned to, the voting precinct of the address of the voter’s last place of residence in this State… If that address is no longer a recognized residential address, the overseas voter must be assigned an address within the voting precinct of the last place of residence for voting purposes.” 

Florida’s statute on the assignment of an address is wider in scope than other states. More specifically, a UOCAVA voter may be assigned an address even if their voting residence is still a recognized residential address. Florida law states that a voter who no longer has a permanent address in the county but intends to remain a resident of Florida and the county in which they are registered to vote may be assigned an address within the precinct of the office of the supervisor of elections. These procedures often apply to military voters who wish to register as a voter in the precinct of an address where they once lived, but no longer have any physical ties. In these instances, the local supervisor of elections will assign the voter an address for voting purposes. 

Implications for Voter Rolls and Election Mail 

The ability of military and overseas citizens to register to vote using their last residential address, or an address that was assigned to them can have significant implications for voter rolls and election mail. If an individual registers to vote using their last residential address, it is possible that those who currently live there are also using the same address to register to vote. As a result, voter rolls will show that multiple individuals are registered to the same address.  

Similarly, if a UOCAVA voter’s last residential address is no longer recognized as a residence, they may be assigned the address of the office of their local election official. There is currently no limit on the number of voters that may be assigned the same address, if they meet the qualifications specified in state statute. As a result, voter rolls will show that multiple people have registered to vote using the residential address of their local election office.  

Because of this, those who currently work or reside at the residential address associated with a UOCAVA voter’s registration may receive election mail that is directed toward the voter. This often happens when a voter’s residential address, rather than their mailing address, is used for mailing purposes. These situations do not imply that anything nefarious is happening or that a jurisdiction’s voter registration rolls are out-of-date. It simply means that a military or overseas citizen is registered to vote using that address.   

Ultimately, the experiences of UOCAVA voters are unique and the barriers they face are not confined to the request and return of their ballot. For some, challenges may arise as early as the voter registration process. The process of assigning a UOCAVA voter an address is solely intended to ensure that these voters can successfully register to vote and cast their ballot in an election. Without such efforts, these voters risk being disenfranchised. 

Faxing Isn’t What You Think It Is: Exploring Alternatives to Mitigate Risks

Anyone working in an office until around 2010 likely recalls the oversized machines that fax, copy and scan, and feature the distinctive dial tone of an outgoing fax. This, however, may be a foreign concept for those more recently entering the workforce.

The use of fax machines has dipped significantly since their heyday in the 1980s and many of the younger generation wouldn’t know how to use one. Yet, for military and overseas voters, faxing is still one of the primary methods to return voted ballots using an electronic method, as opposed to snail mail.

Military and overseas voters covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) often face unique challenges in requesting, receiving and returning election materials due to living in austere conditions abroad where they don’t have access to many forms of communication. Election officials and state legislatures prioritize giving these voters every chance to cast a ballot — in many cases they are defending our country, after all. As such, 31 states allow for some method for these voters to return a ballot electronically.

Many states specifically use the term “fax” or “facsimile” in statute and list it as one of the methods of electronic ballot return. It is the only permitted method of electronic return in seven states and, in 2016, it accounted for 36% of the total transmitted military and overseas citizen ballots. In some cases, this language is a vestige from previous decades when fax was more heavily used but may also be due to a perception that faxing using land lines is a more secure method of transmitting ballots.

It’s important to note that what we traditionally think of as faxing by use of traditional land lines is not the way that documents are typically faxed today. Household and business landlines are becoming less common. More people are relying on online fax services, which is a trend accelerated by the global pandemic when an influx of workers shifted to working remotely.

A fax today doesn’t look the way it did when the technology was first invented in the 1800s when reproductions of images were sent via telegraph. The method isn’t even the same as it was in the 1990s when the Federal Voting Assistance Program started its Electronic Transmission Service, allowing servicemembers serving in the Persian Gulf to send and receive election materials via fax.

Faxing today isn’t completely reliant on telephone networks; it often uses the internet. Multipurpose fax machines commonly used today typically access an external network, introducing many of the same potential vulnerabilities as other internet-connected systems. At the same time, faxing has proven incapable of evolving, and does not incorporate the security mitigations available to other networked devices.

However, secure electronic voting methods are not entirely far from reach. There is a way to electronically verify digital signatures for Military voters through the end-to-end encryption of a Department of Defense Common Access Card, also known as a CAC. In January 2023, the Federal Voting Assistance Program submitted a Report to Congress on End-to-End Electronic Voting Services. The report describes the opportunity for the Federal Government to utilize email transmissions for Military personnel and election officials with CACs. A CAC comes with digital signature verification, allowing enhanced encryption of the sender and recipient. Unfortunately, a CAC falls under the Department of Defense, which, as it stands, does not extend end-to-end email verification between Military personnel and election officials. There would need to be State level authorization access to accept election materials from digital signatures. However, there is an opportunity to research alternatives such as the Federal Public Key Infrastructure, or FPKI, working in conjunction with other Federal partners.


Exploring more secure electronic submission alternatives to faxing is vital for helping Military and Overseas voters. States may want to consider their permitted methods of electronic return for UOCAVA voters in light of evolving technologies and the fact that faxing today isn’t the same as faxing in the pre-internet era.

In the words of Thomas Jefferson:

Vermont’s Voter Portal: Providing Online Ballot Delivery to UOCAVA Voters, Voters with Disabilities, and more

If there is one constant in election administration, it’s change.

Election officials are constantly innovating to meet the evolving needs of voters. Voter portals, “one-stop self-service” sites, enable voter access to individualized voting materials.

Vermont’s election portal, called My Voter Page or MVP for short, provides a web-based data search interface of information extracted from Vermont’s statewide voter registration database. MVP provides a web-based data search interface of information extracted from Vermont’s statewide voter registration database.[2]

MVP was first introduced to Vermont’s voters for use in the Nov. 8, 2016 election by Jim Condos, former Vermont Secretary of State.

In early 2015, the Vermont Secretary of State’s office initiated an 18-month development and implementation plan for the voter portal as part of a larger Election Management System solution. Election management and portal development began after a competitive procurement process resulting in the selection of a PCC Technology Group, LLC, now known as Civix, the state’s collaborator.

Elections in Vermont are conducted at the township level by 247 town clerks. According to Will Senning, Vermont Director of Elections, building an election management system stemmed from a desire to include an individualized hub for a voter’s information and allow each voter to interact electronically with their specific clerk. The portal allows voters to view their sample ballot, respond to a National Voter Registration Act notice, request an absentee ballot, check that the request was received and view the absentee ballot issue date and the date the clerk received the ballot.

From the outset, Vermont’s MVP allowed all Vermont residents to electronically register to vote, take the voter oath, review or respond to any voter challenge letters, find their elected officials and check their:

  • Voter registration status
  • Absentee ballot status.
  • Mail-in application and ballot status.
  • Poll location.
  • Registration information on file with the town office.
  • Sample ballot for the upcoming election.

Portal Use for Vermont’s Military & Overseas Voters

This includes all Vermont military and overseas citizens covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA). On Aug. 29, 2016, Condos told Vermont Business Magazine,  

“Voting for our military and overseas voters is now easier than ever. It is my pleasure to present this information [about MVP] to help these Vermonters register and vote.”

Through MVP, Vermont’s military personnel and overseas citizens can easily participate in the election process by registering to vote and requesting a blank ballot online. In Vermont, voters covered by UOCAVA must return their ballots by mail. However, they may request their ballot by phone, fax, email or mail. They may also request that their unvoted blank ballot and certificate for the return envelope be delivered to them electronically via MVP. Voters who request delivery of a blank ballot through MVP receive an email generated by the system stating their ballot is available and providing them with a login. The voter can access the ballot through MVP and either mark the ballot through onscreen marking before printing, or hand mark the ballot and then return it by mail. Per UOCAVA, any ballot requested more than 45 days before the election will be mailed on the 45th day before the election. This means that if the blank ballot is sent electronically the voter would receive it immediately, allowing them more time to return their completed ballot.

Accessible Voting and Vermont’s Portal

According to Vermont’s Election Division website, “Vermont’s election laws are designed to make it easy for all eligible Vermonters to vote and to register to vote. One of the specific purposes of the Vermont Election Laws is ‘to provide equal opportunity for all citizens of voting age to participate in political processes.’”

In 2018, after a competitive procurement process, a new accessible voting solution was introduced by the Vermont Secretary of State’s office. This solution – OmniBallot – is a tablet-based ballot marking system that marks the voter’s selections onto paper ballots, increasing the privacy and independence of a voter with disabilities. OmniBallot also contains an online interface that enables citizens with disabilities to vote from home during the early voting period.

Post-Pandemic Voting by Mail and the Portal

After experimenting with vote-by-mail procedures during the COVID-19 pandemic, Vermont joined California, Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, Utah and Washington to become one of eight states that now conduct elections almost entirely by mail.

As a result of a 2021 Vermont law, all active registered voters in Vermont are now mailed a ballot for each general election, unless they have requested that their ballot be electronically delivered via their MVP. All Vermont voters are able to cast an absentee ballot if they so choose. Vermont voters can return their ballots via mail, in-person at their town or city clerk’s office, via secure ballot drop box before Election Day or at their polling place on Election Day.

Vermont’s My Voter Portal conveniently and securely facilitates voter registration, viewing of a sample ballot, electronic ballot delivery, ballot tracking and more. It is a valuable tool supporting Vermont’s new vote-by-mail process and for the state and local election officials who serve voters – including military and overseas Vermonters worldwide, and voters with accessibility challenges .


[2]  MVP is not the official record of a voter’s registration. Voter registration records are retained by each person’s voter registration office in the specific Vermont town where they reside at https://mvp.vermont.gov/.

Voting Abroad: Lessons and Takeaways from Italy 2022

The Overseas Voting Initiative (OVI) traveled to Italy in December 2022 to gain a better understanding of the challenges that Americans living overseas face when voting from abroad.

The first day of meetings in Venice kicked off with Denise Tecchio from American Corners based in Trieste, Italy. American Corners, or American Spaces, are supported by the U.S. Department of State and provide cultural programs and events for foreign citizens. In addition to providing English language classes, a maker space for doing crafts and DIY projects and a ukulele club to sing English songs, Ms. Tecchio’s group assists American citizens with information on elections and voting. American Corners in Triste coordinates with the U.S. Embassy in Milan to help voters send their ballots by diplomatic post. The OVI group had a good conversation with Ms. Tecchio about the barriers to voting in primaries, which is not just a problem faced by overseas citizens, but a nationwide turnout problem.


Upon arrival in Florence the following day, the group traveled to the Florence American Cemetery and Memorial, containing the headstones of 4,392 Americans who died defending freedom during World War II in Italy. The group heard from an American citizen who is the superintendent of the facility, which is owned by the U.S. government, about the history of the war effort in Italy. Election Assistance Commission Chair Thomas Hicks and Commissioner Donald Palmer, recently retired Vermont Secretary of State Jim Condos and Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) Director Scott Wiedmann laid wreaths at the memorial.


The next day’s meetings began with information on FVAP’s Ambassador program. Developed over the last several years, the program engages expatriate Americans living in a country to act as liaisons to help U.S. citizens vote. Ambassadors are currently located in Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom. Italy’s FVAP Ambassador, Sean Greene, told the group that the most common question he gets are about a voter’s residency and which address to use when voting. He also received many practical questions, like how to provide the embassy a ballot to include in the diplomatic pouch, how to fold an FVAP-provided DYI envelope and whom to contact with questions. Mr. Greene noted that during the pandemic it was more difficult to engage voters, but he was able to engage overseas citizens online through social media and Zoom Q&A sessions facilitated by the embassy and consulates. Going forward, Mr. Greene suggested that FVAP could have regional ambassadors who set up virtual office hours and conduct much of their outreach online.


The afternoon session in Florence and morning session in Rome featured discussions with expatriates about the barriers they face in returning ballots from abroad. Of note, these discussions highlighted that Europe has stronger privacy laws than we are accustomed to in the United States, making it difficult to identify and track U.S. citizens living abroad. This can make it hard to reach these citizens to inform them of their right to vote and how to cast a ballot. It can also take a long time for mail to travel from abroad to the United States, and there is sometimes a lack of trust in the local mail system, particularly in Italy.

Another barrier is simply understanding the system. Expatriates don’t always realize that getting a ballot is a multi-step process that requires a citizen to first register to vote and then request a ballot, or that the Federal Post Card Application (FPCA) in most states achieves both of these requests. Additionally, depending on their state of residency, voters may have to request a ballot each calendar year. There is also a misunderstanding about “intent to return,” the question that classifies overseas citizens as living permanently overseas or temporarily overseas, which affects the type of ballot voters are eligible to receive in some states. Often, U.S. citizens living abroad aren’t sure whether or not they will return to the U.S. and they have difficulty answering the question. They may also worry about tax implications, both in the U.S. and in their current country of residence, depending on how they answer the question.


The final activity of the group was a highlight for many – a visit to the U.S. Embassy in Rome and a tour of the mail facilities. The Embassy in Rome and other U.S. Overseas Missions (embassies and consulates) provide secure collection boxes for U.S. citizens to return their ballots during federal elections. Ballots are sent to the U.S. via an unclassified diplomatic pouch, through the Diplomatic Post Office (DPO). Diplomatic pouches containing ballots and other unclassified mail are sent first to a sorting facility in Dulles, Virginia, and then put into the U.S. mail stream. This process has important implications for election officials because many states permit ballots from military and overseas voters to be counted if they are received after election day but postmarked beforehand. The issue of how they are postmarked when received at a U.S. embassy and when they are received at the Dulles sorting facility thus may affect whether the ballot is ultimately counted or not.


The ability for overseas citizens to track their ballots through the system is another area of concern for those living abroad. Engaged voters like to be informed of when their ballot arrives in the U.S., is in the hands of election officials and is ultimately counted. Using the DPO system described above, State Department employees and their eligible family members can track their ballots, but expatriates not associated with the State Department don’t have tracking capabilities.

The conversations and many lessons learned from the trip to Italy will help inform the work of the OVI in the coming years, with a particular focus on understanding the unique barriers of private, non-military citizens living overseas.

Sandboxes and “Go Bags”: How New Jersey Election Officials Prepare for Crises

An interior image of the NJ "go bag" with the computer and all related components included

The Council of State Governments (CSG) Overseas Voting Initiative (OVI) 2019 report Examining the Sustainability of Balloting Solutions for Military and Overseas Voting, said “states are under increasing legislative pressure to have contingency plans in place for all aspects of their election systems, including the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) balloting solutions, due to recent national disasters such as Hurricane Sandy, Hurricane Maria and Hurricane Dorian, and global threats of terrorism, civil disobedience, cyberattacks and mail service disruptions.” A case study in emergency preparedness can be found in New Jersey.

Superstorm Sandy is known as such because it was more than just a hurricane that ripped through the East Coast of North America beginning on October 22, 2012. Sandy was a Category 3 hurricane followed immediately by a post-tropical cyclone that made landfall in rapid-fire succession over several days. The storm did not end until November 2 after killing at least 117 people in the United States plus 69 people in Canada and the Caribbean. It also left $68 billion in destruction in its wake, even forcing the closure of the New York Stock Exchange for two consecutive days, the first time this happened since 1888 due to a weather catastrophe.

The state of New Jersey sustained a great deal of damage as a result of Sandy. Election Day in 2012 – a presidential election year – was on November 6, just four days after Superstorm Sandy ended. State and local election officials in affected areas – especially in hardest hit New Jersey – worked in response to ensure citizens displaced or disrupted by the storm were able to exercise their right to vote. Sandy was obviously no easy situation to manage, but a scenario not unfamiliar to election officials across the nation.

Election officials are some of our nation’s greatest go-to resources for contingency planning and logistical challenges. They are leaders in thought and action when it comes to disaster preparedness and resilience of operations. Elections must always happen as scheduled, in spite of any hurdle, disruption, or disaster. New Jersey election officials in a post-Sandy environment certainly typify this statement.

If a state is going to supply its counties with necessary tools for today’s ever-evolving technology and security environments, they wanted to make their investment – paid for through the Help America Vote Act Election Security Funds – stretch as far as possible to include tools for disaster recovery, contingency planning, redundancy, and sandboxing for UOCAVA and other electronically returned ballots.

Thus, in addition to the Chromebook with its sandboxing environment, New Jersey’s Go Bags were later augmented to include a second Chromebook to serve as a redundant back-up, as well as a printer, a hot spot router, multiple power supplies, paper, and pens. These items were then fitted in secure, durable hard-shell cases for each local election office.

New Jersey’s aptly-termed “Go Bag” is an example of a statewide initiative to enhance contingency planning. Local election jurisdictions can be prepared for all types of unforeseen circumstances and emergencies that can negatively impact the administration of elections in their state.

New Jersey’s Go Bag is a portable election office, developed by the New Jersey Division of Elections team as a contingency plan and business process continuity tool. It contains the necessary supplies for local election officials in New Jersey’s 21 counties to conduct business from anywhere and meet multiple disaster scenarios.

In addition to its role in business continuity efforts, the Go Bag also serves as a stand-alone workstation. It enables the detection and mitigation of malware and other cybersecurity threats from email attachments and other electronic files received by local election officials.

Each Go Bag contains a dedicated, stand-alone, mobile Chromebook workstation with a “sandboxing environment,” for retrieval of electronic ballots, as New Jersey law permits military and overseas citizen ballots to be returned electronically. New Jersey typically requires a mailed ballot as well, but that requirement may be waived in a declared emergency. A sandbox is a separate, partitioned environment where electronic ballot attachments can be opened securely by election officials to isolate potential viruses or other malware prior to an email entering the local network or mail server. If threatening activity is detected, the email is flagged and the election officials is prevented from unknowingly opening the malicious content, thereby infecting their network. Thus, sandboxing provides New Jersey’s local election offices with a more protective environment where electronic ballot attachments and other balloting materials can be opened securely – and separately from their other systems potentially averting a major issue.  For reference, New Jersey’s sandboxing environment deployment is similar to the technology implementation in South Carolina as described in this OVI article.

It’s important to note that New Jersey’s local election duties are divided among multiple county offices. County clerks use the sandboxing solution to process military, overseas citizen, and vote-by-mail applications, while the county boards of election use them to safely open returned electronic ballots from voters authorized to cast electronic ballots. Therefore, the state purchased 51 sandboxing environments – and 51 Go Bags – for all the local election official offices across their 21 counties including county clerks, board of elections offices, and in the case of New Jersey’s larger counties, the county superintendents of elections /commissioners of registration.

New Jersey’s dual purpose “Go Bag” for each of its 21 counties equipped with two Chromebooks, a printer, a hot spot router, multiple power supplies, paper, and pens in a case.

New Jersey’s Go Bags are an effective tool for mitigating cybersecurity risks and enabling continuity of election operations in the face of unforeseen logistical challenges in any type of emergency. Thus, we’re sharing this implementation overview from New Jersey in the event it helps other states and local jurisdictions who are considering various election risk mitigation strategies. We also encourage state and local election officials to share their ideas or proven methods with us by emailing us at [email protected].

How the Adoption of Secure Email Accounts and Sandboxing Techniques Strengthen the Electronic Ballot Return Process for South Carolina’s Military and Overseas Voters

Electronic Ballot Return Background

Military and overseas voters, and other U.S. citizens covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), face significant challenges when attempting to cast their ballot. Recent figures from the U.S. Department of Defense Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) indicate that since 2016, there is a 60-65 percentage point gap in voting participation between U.S. domestic and overseas voters, depending on the type of federal election (presidential or midterm) being administered. Approximately half of this gap can be attributed to obstacles preventing those who want to vote from doing so.

While electronic ballot return presents potential benefits and a unique opportunity to improve voting outcomes among UOCAVA voters, balance between critical security considerations and ballot access is necessary for success. This challenge is discussed in The Council of State Governments (CSG) Overseas Voting Initiative (OVI) 2021 paper, Electronic Ballot Return for Military and Overseas Voters: Considerations for Achieving Balance Between Security and Ballot Access.

In this digital age, many jurisdictions have considered the potential risks and benefits of electronic ballot return and have opted to allow for some method of electronic return for UOCAVA voters. Thirty-one states have authorized some form of electronic return for those voting outside the polling place.* *Only 22 of these states have allowed UOCAVA voters to return their ballot via electronic mail. To mitigate the security risks associated with emailing ballots, states and local election jurisdictions continually deploy measures to verify the integrity of a voted ballot and protect local networks from malware.

Two such risk mitigation measures are the application of sandboxing techniques and the use of .gov email domains by election officials. In the cybersecurity field, a sandbox is another term for an isolated environment on a network that allows the secure review of material potentially infected with malware without risking harm to the host device or network.

Electronic Ballot Return via Email in South Carolina

South Carolina is among the 22 states allowing email return of marked ballots. In 2015, the legislature adopted §7-15-690 allowing the South Carolina State Election Commission to, “take all steps and action as may be necessary” to ensure that citizens covered by UOCAVA have the opportunity to vote. This direction authorized the State Election Commission to allow for the electronic return of marked ballots by all UOCAVA voters.

In South Carolina, as in most states and local election jurisdictions, limited resources have made it difficult for local election officials to acquire and update cutting-edge digital tools that help protect against continually evolving cyber threats. Election officials facing both resource and time constraints often have resorted to using platforms such as Google Mail and Yahoo Mail to conduct election-related duties. These commercial platforms do not necessarily have heightened security protocols in place that allow emails containing ballots to be robustly screened for malware and subsequently quarantined.

Statewide Adoption of Sandboxing Techniques in South Carolina

By late 2018, in an effort to apply heightened security protocols across all local election offices in South Carolina while still being mindful of costs, former Executive Director for the South Carolina Election Commission Marci Andino and her team began collaborating with South Carolina’s State Data Center to set up secure email addresses to be used by all 46 county election offices. The resulting accounts were set up with .gov domains to help voters better identify local election officials and therefore, give the voters confidence in the election information provided.

The creation of these secure email accounts also posed unique security benefits for local election officials. Through the State Data Center, sandboxing techniques were integrated into the new accounts to provide officials with enhanced and continuous protection against malware. In essence, sandboxing provides account holders with a more secure environment where electronic ballot attachments can be opened securely to isolate potential viruses or other malware. This is done prior to an email entering the local network or mail server. If threatening activity is detected, the email is flagged and the account holder is prevented from unknowingly opening the malicious content, thereby infecting their network.

Beginning in January 2019, all counties in South Carolina were required to either adopt the state-issued email account or provide the State Election Commission with proof the county was using another secure system. Given the significant cost of instituting sandboxing techniques individually, most South Carolina local election offices opted to transition their communication with voters to the state supplied .gov accounts. Voter instructions and other supporting ballot materials were modified using these new email addresses.

Rollout Factors Leading to Success in South Carolina

According to Andino, the transition to .gov email addresses was initially met with reluctance from some local officials. That quickly passed when officials understood how easy and cost-effective these changes would be and how much this process would enhance the security of the electronic ballot delivery process. “Resistance to change is natural and rarely is there a perfect time to implement technology changes. Our job at the South Carolina Election Commission was to explain the value of the new technology and make the transition as easy as possible for the local election officials and their voters.” said Andino. “We did just that.”

In South Carolina, the State Election Commission plays an integral role in the conduct of elections at the local level. All local jurisdictions receive the technology infrastructure necessary to conduct an election from the State Election Commission. This structure has facilitated the adoption of secure .gov email accounts throughout the state. Uniform voter registration databases, voting systems and corresponding administrative procedures also have helped minimize the number and type of issues encountered at the local level. Furthermore, the authority of the State Election Commission has helped ensure all South Carolina local election offices, not just a select few, are using secure email accounts.

As of early 2022, the .gov email accounts have been used throughout South Carolina in hundreds of elections without issue. Through leveraging the State Data Center to create these accounts, local election officials in South Carolina have gained access to effective threat detection and mitigation safeguards that would otherwise be too costly for local jurisdictions to implement and troubleshoot.

When authorized by state statute, email remains the most popular electronic ballot return method used by UOCAVA voters. As technology evolves, the cyber threats to the email transmission of ballots increase. Enhanced security measures and risk mitigation strategies are warranted to ensure the secrecy and integrity of a voter’s ballot is preserved. CSG’s work with South Carolina and other states utilizing sandboxing techniques has uniquely positioned OVI to support states as they seek to implement similar solutions. Please reach out if OVI can assist in connecting your office with other states and local election offices who have successfully transitioned to secure email and sandboxing.

*Special acknowledgement to CSG OVI Working Group member and former Director of the South Carolina Election Commission, Marci Andino, for working with the OVI team on this piece, as well as to CSG team member, Rachel Wright.

**For the purposes of this article, forms of electronic ballot return include email, fax, and secure web portal.

Enhancing the EAVS with Administrative Data

Heat map of the World showing number of ballot requests by country excluding US

The Election Administration and Voting Survey – Purpose and Limitations

The Election Assistance Commission (EAC) released the 2020 biennial Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) results. The EAC administers the EAVS to state election officials, who provide aggregated administrative election data. That data is analyzed by the EAC, researchers, and election officials to better understand the voting process—including voter registration, voting equipment, poll workers, polling locations, and a variety of other topics. EAVS is an important mechanism providing a source of data that is unavailable anywhere else.

As important as the EAVS is, there are still issues with the data that is supplied. For example, election administrators report that EAVS questions are often confusing and attempt to translate practices that vary widely across localities to standardized categories. As a result, administrators may be asked to supply answers to questions that are not applicable to their locality. While we have seen steady improvement in the level of data completion of the data sets, there is still work to be done.

As Jack Williams, Senior Researcher at MIT Election Lab, noted in a recent article, “(The EAVS) is the most valuable in getting a national perspective on how Americans vote. Still, it’s no substitute for the administrative data maintained by the states themselves, which often differ from EAVS for many reasons that are justified.”

The EAVS Section B Data Standard – Purpose and Added Value

A comprehensive analysis of administrative election data stands to provide critical insight into effective policies. At this time, the EAVS can only provide limited information due to the nature of aggregated date and, at times, ambiguous questions subject to interpretation by election officials. The Council of State Governments Overseas Voting Initiative (OVI) is dedicated to improving the process of voting for military and overseas citizens and intends to use the implementation of the EAVS Section B (ESB) Data Standard as a catalyst to do so. We wrote more about the development of the ESB Data Standard here.

Section B of the EAVS collects data about military and overseas citizen voting. There is a wealth of knowledge that can be gleaned from this data, especially if collected at a transactional level. The ESB Data Standard does just this. This standard allows us to dig deeper into the data than EAVS, thus providing us with a better understanding of what can lead to either voting success or voting failure among military and overseas citizens.

More than that, the data can point to opportunities for further research. This would involve meeting with states and local jurisdictions to better understand what the data is showing. For example, perhaps we suddenly see a sharp decline in the rejection of ballots due to a missing voter signature. This could be caused by any number of things—more effective voter education, a new curing policy, a different set of instructions included with balloting materials, or just sheer luck. Upon speaking with election officials, we could determine if there was a particular action that yielded this result and highlight these findings for jurisdictions interested in doing the same. As another point of analysis, the ESB Data Standard can help officials mitigate the ever-changing difficulties of mail delivery during a pandemic. Data gathered according to the Standard can determine where a voter is located overseas , where a mail service disruption(s) took place, and if the mitigating strategies put in place were successful . This information is collected through multiple data fields of the Standard such as a voter’s mailing country. A visualization is provided below demonstrating the number of ballot requests by country. This figure was generated using the ESB data provided by a subset of working group members who have implemented the standard in their local context.*

Heat map of the World showing number of ballot requests by country excluding US

It is important to work with the election officials to not just understand what is in the data set, but “the why” behind that data. Because EAVS is asking very specific questions that are at times confusing to election administrators, the full story behind the data is sometimes lost. Our goal with our project is to ensure that we are asking the why, as that can better inform reflections on policy changes.

Additionally, the work election administrators put into completing the EAVS is extremely burdensome. Often, states must enlist the help of local election officials to answer some parts of EAVS. These officials often have limited resources and, in many cases, numerous other job duties in addition to election administration. Our hope with the ESB Data Standard is that, upon creating either a database query or a report that aligns with the standard, it will be easy for election officials to pull all relevant transactional data with little effort.

Adaptability of the Standard

What is most exciting about the ESB Data Standard is its adaptability. Because the standard was designed to accommodate both traditional absentee voting models and vote-by-mail models, it can easily be modified to capture EAVS Section C data. EAVS Section C deals with all other by mail voting from absentee voting (other than military and overseas citizens), permanent absentee voting, to by-mail voting. As such, the structure of the ESB Data Standard already aligns with Section C of the EAVS.

Development of the Standard

The ESB Data Standard was developed in collaboration with election officials. Through soliciting their insight, the Standard was designed to incorporate the data that jurisdictions currently collect as well as the data that are central to a comprehensive understanding of the voting process. The OVI has also worked with election officials in one state to map processes pertaining to how military and overseas citizens register to vote, request their ballot, and vote their ballot. Such work revealed where the state’s database system captured or failed to collect ESB data points. The OVI also learned that some data points were captured and maintained outside of the state database, helping to explain why certain data points were not available in our research.

Overall, the EAVS provides us with a wealth of information. However, we believe that leveraging data standards such as the ESB Data Standard is a worthwhile investment. These standards allow us to acquire transactional level administrative data directly from the states in a manner that is less time consuming, creates less ambiguity in the data responses from election officials, and provides a more robust data set to analyze.


*The map was generated with the data from Colorado, Washington, Orange County, and Los Angeles County, and excludes records where the mailing location was the United States.